The Census Bureau reported earlier today that US imports of foreign goods jumped 9.9% year-over-year in October. That is the second largest increase since February 2012, just less than the 12% import growth recorded for January earlier this year. In both monthly cases, however, the almost normal rates of increase which would have at least suggested moving closer to a healthy economy (from the view of US demand) were instead boosted considerably by oil price effects.
Removing them, US imports excluding petroleum rose by just 6.7% year-over-year in October. That’s about the same level of expansion as the rest of this year, one that is so far slightly less than in 2014 and still nowhere near the economy of full employment.
Past periods of overall US economic acceleration had produced much different levels of demand for foreign products aside from Middle Eastern crude. In 2004, for example, when that recovery, loosely speaking, finally kicked in US imports excluding oil were rising by more than 15%. With imports of crude climbing regularly by 30-50%, total US imports of goods from the rest of the world got to be nearly 20% at that time.
It was for our foreign trade partners their successful use of the eurodollar system to finance the building of their own productive capacities as well as the systems required (including financial) for such a high degree of trade mobility. Had that all been purchased by income growth via productive expansion in the US (a significant enough shift of high value payrolls for the low value jobs shipped overseas), the last ten years would very likely have been much different.
Instead, again, what was behind both sides was unchallenged monetary expansion. Absent that energizing, lubricating factor the world languishes everywhere; the rise of especially EM wealth during the last decade has proved so hollow, meaning it wasn’t really wealth at all.
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